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LEGAL PATTERNS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
PARTICIPATORY TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Rainer Nickel*
“The upshot of the activities of international
organisations is that today most citizens greatly
underestimate the extent to which most nations’
shipping laws are written at the IMO in London, air
safety laws at the ICAO in Montreal, food standards at
the FAO in Rome, intellectual property laws in Geneva
at the WTO/WIPO, banking laws by the G-10 in Basle,
chemical regulations by the OECD in Paris, nuclear
safety standards by IAEA in Vienna, telecommunications
laws by the ITU in Geneva and motor vehicle standards
by the ECE in Geneva.”1
Multilevel trade governance and transnational social regulation
put democratic self-regulation under stress. A growing number of
supra- and transnational norms, rules, and regulations on trade,
environmental issues, or any other field of regulation prove that
we are facing another ‘great transformation’, the transformation of
international relations and intergovernmental politics into lawgenerating fora, with government networks and court-like
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institutions as central actors. This process of transnational
juridification limits parliamentary rooms for manoeuvre and
comprehensively alienates many citizens submitted to
transnational regulation from this process.
This contribution attempts to clarify the mechanisms at work (I).
In a second step it seeks to identify possible concepts that could
grasp this transformation, and confronts them again with the
problem of self-government. In a bow to the particularities of the
transnational sphere, it tries to resist the methodological ‘nationstate trap’. Instead, it supports a constitutionalization of
participative structures in global administrative governance (II).
The outline, degree, and limits of such a concept are not selfexplaining. The EU and its attempts to integrate civic
participation, thus, may illustrate concrete outlines of such a
project (III). This reconstruction allows for concluding
observations on global structures and the constitutionalisation of
participatory transnational governance on a global scale (IV).

I. DEMOCRACY AND TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION
In modern democracies, legal norms are products of parliaments at least, that is what most citizens think and take for granted.
However, this is not an adequate description of today’s reality: it is
widely acknowledged and well documented that supranational and
international entities or arrangements play an increasing role in
the shaping of national law. If a significant portion of law is
‘written’ elsewhere, instead of by the elected national parliaments,
as the above quoted authors of a voluminous study on global
business regulation suggest, there is either a problem with the use
of the term ‘law’, or with the concept of democracy that underlies
our self-description as citizens of democratic states (and a
democratic European Union). The latter problem of democratic
rule is the focus of an intense debate about democracy beyond the
nation state, and is fuelled by the perception that the gap between
normative models of democratic rule and the findings of many
studies about the increasing amount of rule-making outside the
nation states is reaching a critical point. The common description
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of this development is that there is a crisis of democracy which is
caused by the quasi-natural forces of globalisation: namely, that
the growing need for transnational regulation is served by
governments and private-party networks, and not by parliaments.
An alternative description of these developments could focus on
law instead of democracy. The starting point could be that our
notion of ‘law’ is an old European one, an outdated version of an
even more outdated Kantian or Rousseauian model of self-rule and
self-government: law is not necessarily the product of procedures
within parliaments, and of governments enforcing it and courts
applying it, but can also be produced within networks of
governments and/or private parties, outside the nation state and in
many variations. Proponents of a post-modern theory of law have
repeatedly made this point. The novelty of this idea, compared to
very early concepts of law outside or independent of the state,2 is
that the dissolution of territorially bound democracy and the
production of binding rules outside the institutional design of
national parliaments is no longer an exception but is actually
becoming the norm.3 In a similar vein, advocates of societal

2

3

See Eugen Ehrlich’s sociological concept of a ‘living law’: E. Ehrlich, Gesetz
und lebendes Recht, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986). This book includes
a reprint of the original article from 1915. Ehrlich’s idea of living law as a
product of society (as opposed to the state-centred approach of the traditional
theory of law and sociology of law) treated non-statal sources of law as
equally legitimate sources as state law, or even as the ‘original’ sources of
law, and this idea implied the assertion that norms set by non-state actors are
part of the legal order even if these parts are not officially approved of by the
state. The Austrian-German legal profession highly contested this view, and
Ehrlich’s theory of living law subsequently became the center of a fierce
controversy between him and Hans Kelsen, see the reprint of the 1915/17
discussion
in:
H.
Kelsen/E.
Ehrlich,
Rechtssoziologie
und
Rechtswissenschaft: eine Kontroverse (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003).
J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos (supra n. 2) provide the most comprehensive
overview of global business regulations that come into being mainly as selfregulations. For rule-making processes in global regulatory networks, see A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, N.J./Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2004).
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constitutionalism or a concept of ‘private transnationalism’ argue
that the nation state itself has only limited capabilities to regulate
both the markets and the social sphere within its own borders.
Consequently, the emerging system of conflict resolution and
market regulation at international level does not need a statal
corset, but guiding procedures and norms which structure the
norm-generating processes.4
However, the terminology used to name and describe the legal
system emerging beyond the nation state clearly suggests that
there is uneasiness with this shift in the rule-making process: the
production and enforcement of law beyond the nation state has
5
cautiously been labelled governance, not government, and the
binding rules of the EC/EU are still not called ‘law’, but
regulations or directives. One of the most interesting details of the
new Draft Constitutional Treaty of the EU is that it replaces the
old EC terminology: regulations become European laws, and
directives become European framework laws.6 Thus, it seems as if
rules and regulations deserve to be called ‘laws’ only after a
constitutionalisation process has taken place.
The uneasiness with supranational and international rule-making
processes found its clearest expression in Europe in the 1990’s
debates on the democratic legitimacy of the EU/EC. Fuelled by

4

5

6

See Ch. Joerges’ contribution in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.),
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006); H. Schepel, The Constitution of
Private Governance -- Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating
Markets (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005).
On the interdisciplinary concept of governance, see G.-F. Schuppert,
“Governance im Spiegel der Wissenschaftsdisziplinen”, in: G.-F. Schuppert
(ed.), Governance-Forschung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005).
See Article I-33 of the Draft Treaty. Article I-6, ‘Union law’, defines the legal
rank of EU laws: “The Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of
the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over
the law of the Member States.” Draft Treaty as amended by the IGC, 6
August 2004, document no. CIG 87/04.
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decisions of several constitutional courts, the infamous Maastricht
7
decision in Germany, as well as the respective decisions of the
Corte Constitutionale and the Conseil Constitutionnel of Italy
and France, a wide discussion started about the possibilities and
the limits of European integration8 and its genuine version of
social regulation.9 This discussion has produced some new and
interesting insights into the possibilities of a legitimate lawgenerating process which is not identical with the familiar
structure of our nation state model: EU governance is a distinct
mode of social regulation that cannot be compared to nation-state
government arrangements, and should not be measured against
nation-state standards.

7

8

9

BVerfGE 89, 155-213. - The decision has been criticised as promoting “Der
Staat über alles”; see J.H.H. Weiler, “The state ‘über alles’: Demos, Telos and
the German Maastricht decision”, in: O. Due et al. (eds), Festschrift für
Ulrich Everling Band 2 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), p. 1651–1688. This
characterisation, however, misses the complexity of the FCC’s reasoning; for
a more relaxed interpretation of the Maastricht decision, see A. v Bogdandy,
“Das Leitbild der dualistischen Legitimation für die europäische
Verfassungsentwicklung: gängige Missverständnisse des Maastricht-Urteils
und deren Gründe (BVerfGE 89, 155 ff.)” in 83 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift
für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (2000) at 284-297.
See Dieter Grimm’s famous intervention against a European constitution:
“Does Europe need a constitution”, 1 ELJ (1995) at 282, and the criticism of
Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe need a
constitution?’”, in 1 ELJ (1995) at 303-307 and in his seminal work Between
Facts and Norms (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). Giandomenico Majone
has taken a different stance: for him, the EU regulatory system has a positive
and effective regulatory function, but beyond this function there is no room
and no legitimacy for any distributive politics, G. Majone, Europe’s
‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4 ELJ (1998) at 5. This view,
however, ignores the redistributive effects of every form of regulation: even if
a norm appears to be ‘purely technical’ on the surface, it still affects actors in
a different manner.
Ch. Joerges/E. Vos (eds.), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and
Politics (Oxford/Portland OR: Hart, 1999); F.W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe
– Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); G.
Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996).
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The starting point here is that the discussion about democratic
rule above or beyond the nation-state level is often dominated by a
number of misleading clichés. The first stereotype concerns the
law-making process within the nation state itself. Democratic rule
is portrayed as parliamentary rule, but a closer look at
contemporary rule-making processes reveals a different picture.
Governments and non-state actors play a significant role in the
pre-formation of legal rules. In particular, governments represent
highly aggregated entities with an enormous potential of
resources, manpower, knowledge assessment, and experience. It is
them – and not the parliaments – which are the primary source
and filter for legislative proposals. Thus, it is “governative
structures”, as von Bogdandy calls them,10 that widely dominate
the law-making process, and not parliamentarians.
Secondly, parliaments do not act in a social vacuum, but within a
societal sphere that is influenced, and partially even dominated, by
aggregated interests and conflicting positions. A patchwork of
unions, employer associations, political parties, NGOs, religious
groups, and many other actors do not merely complement the lawgenerating political process, but basically constitute this process
by participating in public debates about, amongst others, market
regulation and social regulation. Here lies the core of what is
widely identified as the democratic problem of supranational and
international regulation/governance: at global level, the lack of
parliamentarianism is accompanied by the lack of a strong global
civil society, global political parties, and a global socio-political
sphere in which conflict about social regulation can be played out
in the open. In other words, it seems that the social humus
necessary for a democratic process worthy of the name does not

10

A. v. Bogdandy, Gubernative Rechtssetzung (Tübingen: Mohr, 2000); see,
also, R. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European
Governance”, in: Ch. Joerges/R. Dehousse (eds.), Good Governance in
Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 207.
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exist at global level. Deliberative democracy11 ends at the national
12
borders.
This does not mean that democracy above or beyond the nation
state is actually impossible or theoretically unthinkable, it is just
not in sight. But if we still take the concept of law seriously, and,
with it, the normative assumption that norms need to be
legitimised in order to be called ‘law’, then it is worth examining
the possible functional equivalents to the norm-generating setting
of the nation-state: participatory arrangements ensuring the
involvement of civil society actors, stakeholders, and the public,
in the arguing, bargaining, and reasoning processes of transnational
regulation, procedural rights safeguarding these procedural
positions, and courts or court-like institutions that flank these
arrangements. These potential functional equivalents – as
elements of a deliberative constitutionalism13 - do not replace the
democratic process necessary for a production of legitimate law,
but they might narrow the legitimacy gap between the ongoing

11

12

13

Here I refer to the notion of deliberative democracy as unfolded by J.
Habermas in his book Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge/Mass.: MIT
Press, 1996) and in his later work The Inclusion of the Other
(Cambridge/Mass: MIT Press, 1998); and to G. Frankenberg’s concept of
republicanism, see G. Frankenberg, Die Verfassung der Republik (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), and the theory of civil society it rests upon, see
U. Rödel/G. Frankenberg/H. Dubiel, Die demokratische Frage (Frankfurt am
Main, Suhrkamp, 1989). Frankenberg, Rödel and Dubiel correctly stress the
idea that social integration is the result of societal conflicts; as a
consequence, there is a need for elaborate frameworks in which conflicts are
staged. This issue cannot be broadened here.
On the challenges of a trans- or supranational constellation for the concept of
deliberative democracy, see D. Curtin, Postnational Democracy. The EU in
Search of a Political Philosophy (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1997).
For the concept of Deliberative Constitutionalism, see P. Nanz, “Democratic
Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance: A View from Political
Theory”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism,
Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, forthcoming 2006).

8

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

process of transnational
constituencies.

social

regulation

[VOL. 02 NO. 01

and

democratic

Clearly, it is the EU that represents the most advanced
supranational entity that generates binding norms, without
simultaneously being a state in the classical sense. The regulatory
system of the EU is, therefore, a prime candidate for additional
value potentials: Can the EU thus be taken as ‘role model’ for a
general legal framework of transnational governance (see below
Section III)? In order to answer this question, though, criteria for
an assessment are needed. A look at legal philosophy and
sociology of law approaches towards the problem of transnational
governance without parliament may provide such a perspective.

II. JUSTIFYING GLOBAL ‘LAW’ WITHOUT
CONSTITUENCIES
Global governance generally lacks any legal patterns of public or
democratic participation. Thus, as stated above, the growing
exercise of regulatory authority by international or supranational
governmental decision-makers in a wide variety of fields and in a
wide variety of forms raises serious legitimacy problems.
Institutionalised entities, such as the EC Council or more loosely
connected networks of government officials, constantly make
decisions in a no-man’s land between politics and law.
Additionally, statements or decisions stemming from global
arrangements in which governments are involved convey –
especially if compared to actions of non-governmental actors - an
additional claim for legitimacy because they are constituted by
public authorities.
On the other hand, there is at least some kind of legitimising
chain which links supra-national and international actors to
constituencies. International treaties, for example, regularly have
to be approved in one way or another by the national parliament
before they become domestic law, and treaty-derived institutions
such as the parliamentary assembly of the European Convention
on Human Rights guarantee at least a certain degree of reference
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to national constituencies. The representatives of national
bureaucracies sent out to take part in international governmental
networks and fora are at least formally linked to the national
governments and are, at least theoretically, controlled by national
parliaments.
Nevertheless, democracy and the rule of law are at stake if the
executive branch of government is released from the chains of
intense parliamentary/public control and of judicial review.
Additionally, empirical research on the patterns of globalisation
draws our attention to the enormous amount of non-state
(‘private’) regulations that shape and rule transnational business
relations and international trade. Private standard-setting bodies,
agreements on technical norms, and other forms of regulative
activities suggest that we are observing a major shift, if not a
change of paradigm, from state regulation and international law
regulations to private international regulations.14 At the same
time, we are experiencing a major increase in ‘hybrid’ activities,
namely, in co-operative international activities of national
15
governments and private actors. Both the tendencies of extended
private governance activities and the hybridisation of international
actors can be integrated in the compromise formula that “the new
legal order is working significant transformations in governance

14

15

Private Governance regimes as described and examined, for example, by C.
Cutler, J. Braithwaite/P. Drahos, or H. Schepel, play a significant role in the
global political economy: see C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global
Business Regulation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), H.
Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance -- Product Standards in the
Regulation of Integrating Markets (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005).- It is,
however, justified to set the main focus here on global arrangements in
which governments are somehow involved: these arrangements convey an
additional claim for legitimacy as they are constituted by public authorities.
As a striking example, the activities of standard-setting bodies such as the
International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO) could be mentioned here.
ISO standards are often used in national courts as legal benchmarks, for
example, in tort cases. Another well-know example is the function of the
private organisation ICANN as world administrator of web site addresses.
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arrangements, both locally and globally, suggesting that the
distinction between the public and the private realms is becoming
16
increasingly difficult to sustain” (Claire Cutler).
Beyond popular slogans warning us against the end of the nation
state or even welcoming this trend, the factual developments
towards international regulatory regimes can be labelled as a trend
towards ‘legal globalisation’. Although a vague concept,
‘globalisation’ clearly reflects the loss of control over a growing
number of transnational issues, e.g., environmental protection,
regulation of international trade and international financial
markets for national parliaments and national administrations.17
Accordingly, national governments try to regain control over the
issues that cannot be dealt with at national level by increasing
their efforts at international level. As a consequence, the
production of law – or regulations – shifts from nation state level
to international level. In the end, governmental actors create
regulations without the direct involvement of constituencies, and
without complementary courts that control the exercise of
authority.
A number of theoretical attempts have been made in recent years
to face the challenges of a transnational legal order that
significantly lacks both democratic legitimacy and transparency.
Four distinct concepts and models of a more legitimate exercise of
international authority can be distinguished: (1) a plea for global
democracy and/or a global state (Globalism); (2) the designation of
governmental or private networks as co-ordinating instruments
(Networkism); (3) the identification of separate global societal

16

17

C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p. 2.
Globalisation’ is an umbrella term, covering a wide variety of linkages
between countries that extend beyond economic interdependence, see M.
Kahler and D.A. Lake, “Globalisation and Governance”, in: M. Kahler and
D.A. Lake (eds.), Governance in a Global Economy (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2003), 1, 3.
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spheres as already constituted fragments of global society (Societal
Constitutionalism); (4) and a normative, process-based conflict of
laws concept which is based on transnational comity (Comitas).
On the basis of this reconstruction I will present the concept of
participatory governance as a viable public law alternative to the
aforementioned approaches (5).

1. GLOBALISM: GLOBAL DEMOCRACY AND WORLD STATISM
A first approach towards a more legitimate rule beyond the nation
state (with the potential of generating more legitimate ‘global law’)
can be characterised by the support for ‘world statism’ and by the
invocation of global democracy. Proponents such as David Held
and Otfried Höffe see the need for an institutional design that
safeguards the democratic input at global level. Otfried Höffe, in
particular, has argued that we have to adhere to the Kantian
premise of self-government by building a world parliament and
world government out of the existing raw material, i.e., the UN
charter and its institutions.18 It is, indeed, tempting to use the
existing UN institutions as a starting point for the creation of
global democracy: the fact that all independent states are members
of the General Assembly conveys a certain legitimising moment to
this institution. There are, however, serious obstacles for such a
project, both from an empirical perspective and from a conceptual
viewpoint: the existing ‘one-state-one-vote’ approach clearly
violates the fundamental idea of democratic representation,
whereas equal representation could mean that half the members of
the parliament would have to be from (non-democratic) China. Of
similar importance is the fact that there is no social humus for a
democratic process on a global scale yet in sight. Finally, the
prospect of a world state could pose an even greater threat to the -

18

O. Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung ( München: Beck,
1999), especially 267-314.
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more or less, but still - functioning democratic systems that are
19
embedded in the societies of the UN member states.
Other authors claim that there is already a global statism in the
making, with or without democracy. For example, M. Albert,
member of the Bielefeld-based Institute for World Society, literally
states that the earth is “on its way to global statehood” (“Die Erde
auf dem Weg zur Weltstaatlichkeit”). He sums up developments
towards an ever tighter net of international regulations and
arrangements in a most fitting manner:
“The exuberant quantitative growth of legal norms in
the world society could be dismissed as a relatively
unspectacular and – in the sense of global dynamics of
modernization – expectable process of global
juridification which, due to the absence of executive
power, remains without consequences. But precisely
here the new quality these processes of juridification
have gained in recent years catches the eye: whether
private arbitration panels such as the one at the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or statebound arbitration panels such as the one of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), or the International Criminal
Court (ICC): all of them stand for a growing formation of
secondary norms in the law of world society, i.e., norms

19

Immanuel Kant, in his famous work ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’ [‘Perpetual
Peace’], introduced the concept of a ‘Weltbürgerrecht’, a cosmopolitan
citizenship right, but stopped short of proposing a ‘world republic’. Instead,
he painted a negative picture of such a world republic as a state: “If all is not
to be lost, there can be, then, in place of the positive idea of a world republic,
only the negative surrogate of an alliance which averts war, endures, spreads,
and holds back the stream of those hostile passions which fear the law…” I.
Kant, Perpetual Peace, (Boston: American Peace Society, 1897). For a
comment and critique of this realist turn in Kant’s concept, see J. Habermas,
“Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?” in: J
Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004),
113-193, especially 125-131.
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that do not only set rules but also constitute procedures
in cases of a breach of the rules, or that contain
provisions dealing with the handling of conflicting rules
(‘Kollisionsnormen’, norms guiding the solution of
conflicts of norms). This reveals a sustainable maturing
of the law beyond the nation state”.20
Albert argues that these additional, procedural patterns of global
law represent a new qualitative step in the development of world
society. In his definition, ‘world statism’ does not mean that a
sovereign world state emerges, but that global law (without a
state) and global politics (without a state) merge into “world
21
statism without a world state”. This opaque merger, however,
represents nothing else but an alternative description of exactly
the paradox that we are trying to resolve.
If comprehensive concepts of global statism and global democracy
are too broad and unrealistic, then an evolutionary model may be
an attractive alternative. Such a vision of a dynamic global
constitutionalism, with the legal framework of the WTO as a
focus point, is supported by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann in his

20

21

M. Albert, “Die Erde auf dem Weg zur Weltstaatlichkeit”, in: Aus Politik
und Zeitgeschichte Nr. 31/32 (26 July 2004), http://www.dasparlament.de/2004/31-32/Thema/031.html [translation:RN].
M. Albert, supra. This observation is widely shared; see M Albrow, The
Global Age (1996), who argues of an already existing world state that
materialises “in joint endeavours to control the consequences of technical
advance for the environment, in shared interests in human rights and in a
common fear of a nuclear catastrophe”, p. 173. see, also, M. Shaw’s portrait
in his “Theory of the Global State” of an emerging world statism, albeit with
a more critical tendency. Shaw holds that the emergent global state is
constituted “by the complex articulation of the globalised Western state
with the global layer of state power”. But he foresees a “lengthy period of
struggle” fought between global democracy and anti-globalist nationalism
until what he calls the “global-democratic revolution” can be completed; in:
M Shaw, Theory of the Global State (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 269.
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contribution to a new volume22 on “Constitutionalism, Multilevel
Trade Governance and Social Regulation” as well as in a number
23
Petersmann
holds
that
the
of
earlier
writings.
constitutionalisation of the WTO is a positive process that serves
to protect “human rights and democratic governance more
effectively”.24 His vision, however, represents a somehow reduced
idea of a constitution: human rights and “the constitutional
functions of open markets and WTO rules for enabling mutually
beneficial co-operation among individuals across discriminatory
state barriers” stand at the core of his idea of a constitution of the
WTO. Open markets and free trade become institutional
expressions of individual human rights to ‘economic freedom’,
while public goods such as environmental protection are scaled
down to mere soft goals in a constitutional balancing process.
Thus, under the supervision of this kind of global minimal state,
regulatory preferences, such as strong labour laws, rather appear as
being ‘discriminatory practices’ than the legitimate expression of a
certain national economic constitution. Embedded in an
intergovernmental framework of international law, and
disembedded from national and global civil societies, a WTO
constitutionalism may, therefore, only intensify the legitimacy
crisis of transnational social regulation, or constrain appropriate
responses to it.25

22

23

24
25

See E.-U. Petersmann, “Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO requires
Multilevel Constitutionalism”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.),
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006), section III (“Constitutionalising
the WTO? Problems and Perspectives”).
See, for example, E.-U. Petersmann, “Time for a United Nations ‘Global
Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide
Organisations: Lessons from European Integration”, 13 European Journal of
International Law (2002), 621-650, and “Constitutional Economics, Human
Rights and the Future of the WTO”, “Aussenwirtschaft”, Swiss Review of
International Economic Relations (2003), p. 49-91.
E.-U. Petersmann, supra note 22, section III.5.a.
R. Howse/K. Nicolaidis, “Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why
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In his recent work, however, Petersmann has widened his
approach towards the ‘constitutional’ structure of the WTO; he
now underlines that there is also a need to integrate issues such as
trade and environment, or trade and social rights, into the
discourse on WTO law. This turn reflects the fact that we are
facing a materialization process in international trade law, with
more and more linkages between trade law and other fields of
social regulation. As Ch. McCrudden and A. Davies aptly put it,
the dream “of a WTO innocent of involvement with non-trade
issues has already been shattered in the context of environmental
norms, and it may only be a matter of time before the same occurs
in the context of labour rights”.26 Whether this fact of an ever
denser body of international ‘trade and…’ law deserves the label
“constitution”, is subject to an ongoing controversy in
international law.27 In the perspective presented here, a
‘constitutionalization’ of transnational bodies that produce
material law is appropriate only if a parallel process of
proceduralization, a process that integrates public discourse and
civil society, with all their inherent contradictions and conflicts,
into the law-making structures, is part of the project.
What all these ‘global’ approaches have in common is that they
perceive the dwindling of self-rule powers of nation-states in a
growing number of regulatory fields as an incentive for the
creation of international institutions which somehow fill the gap
between constituencies and transnational governance. They use
the classical nation-state model, with its features of democratic
representation, constitutional rights, accountable administration

26

27

Constitutionalising the WTO is a Step too Far”, in: R.B. Porter et al. (eds),
Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multi-lateral Trading System at the
Millenium, (Washington/DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 227, at
230.
Ch. McCrudden & A. Davies, “Human rights sanctions and the World Trade
Organisation”, in F. Francioni (ed.), Environment, Human Rights and
International Trade (Oxford; Portland, Or.: Hart, 2001), at 194.
E.-U. Petersmann, supra note 22, section IV.2-4.
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and independent courts, all embedded in a constitutional
framework, as a blueprint and a normative reference point. What
is striking, though, is the fact that many proponents of global
democracy and world statism, either explicitly or implicitly, take
it for granted that only parliamentarianism can represent the core
of the nation state model of democracy, or they state the necessity
of ‘more democracy’ without seriously addressing the obvious
conceptual and practical questions arising from such an approach:
who is the electorate?, or: what are the foundations and the
competences of a global state?

2. NETWORKISM: THE NETWORK METAPHOR
The failure of positions supporting world statism and global
democracy to deliver a convincing answer to the complex problem
posed by the lack of a clearly-defined global public sphere, or a
global electorate, has fuelled attempts to describe global authority
not in statal terms, but with the metaphor of a network. The most
recent example is A.-M. Slaughter’s book “A New World Order”,
in which she emphasises the advantages of decentralised
government networks at international level in contrast to the
unitary world state vision.28 Her approach praises the flexibility,
problem-solving capacity, and efficiency of governmental
networks: normative voluntarism is replaced here by a
functionalist concept. The stabilising effect on world peace and
the actual success of governmental networks in addressing urgent
transnational issues such as the weakening of the ozone layer, or
the spread of nuclear raw material and nuclear technology create
an efficient global order that is justified by its own success:
“Global governance through government networks is
good public policy for the world and good national
foreign policy for the United States, the European Union,
APEC members, and all developing countries seeking to

28

A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2004).
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participate in global regulatory processes and needing to
strengthen their capacity for domestic governance. Even
in their current form, government networks promote
convergence, compliance with international agreements,
and improved co-operation among nations on a wide
range of regulatory and judicial issues. A world order
self-consciously created out of horizontal and vertical
government networks could go much further. It could
create a genuine global rule of law without centralised
global institutions and could engage, socialise, support,
and constrain government officials of every type in every
nation. In this future, we could see disaggregated
government institutions – the members of government
networks – as actual bearers of a measure of sovereignty,
strengthening them still further but also subjecting them
to specific legal obligations. This would be a genuinely
different world, with its own challenges and its own
promise.”29
It is certainly inappropriate to mock this approach as an
educational concept which aims at a global reformatory where the
bureaucracies of the world learn from the most advanced how to
govern the world.30 On the contrary, there is, indeed, an intrinsic

29
30

A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order, 261-62.
Another reading of Slaughter’s approach could be that its tendency to
functional realism has to be understood in the present political environment
of a more and more unilaterally acting US government (see, for example, the
article ‘Washington is criticised for Growing Reluctance to Sign Treaties’,
New York Times, 4 April 2002, on two reports of the Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research and the Lawyer’s Committee on Nuclear Policy
about the United States’ rejection or disregard of a range of international
treaties). In this reading, Slaughter may also try to justify international law
and international treaties (and international lawyers) as an important
element of the legal order of the United States. Her reluctance to support a
more institutionalised form of global governance, thus, may be motivated by
and directed against US unilateralism. She does not, however, challenge the
danger of an instrumental use of international law as a means for an
‘imperial’ or hegemonic world order, an outspoken tendency within the Bush
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value in advanced forms of bureaucratic co-operative
experimentalism that may lead to creative solutions for pressing
31
32
transnational problems and open fora for mutual learning.
Problem solving, on the other hand, is not a purely technical or
scientific process, it also demands the definition of a problem and
the selection of an adequate solution. Output-oriented approaches
tend to suppress this aspect of agenda-setting as well as the
problem of choices,33 for example, the critical evaluation of

31

32

33

administration and academia alike. For a critique of hegemonic tendencies;
see,for example, M. Koskenniemi’s article “Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple
Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought”, typoscript Harvard University
2005, available at http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/eci/PluralismHarvard.pdf
, or N. Krisch, “More Equal Than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and U.S.
Predominance in International Law”, in: M. Byers and G. Nolte (eds), United
States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 135-175.
See the seminal article by Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer on the unique structure of
the EU committees system: “From intergovernmental bargaining to
deliberative political processes : the constitutionalisation of comitology”, 3
European Law Journal (1997), 273-299; another practical example of a
problem-solving and issue-oriented international regulatory system is the
“Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes and their disposal” from 22 March 1989 (www.basel.int), which
introduced an effective system for controlling the exportation, importation
and disposal of hazardous wastes, and has been ratified by about 160 UN
member states so far (with the notable exception of the US). Finally, the
European Union’s ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’ (OMC) could be
mentioned here as a new and potentially creative (but also potentially
ineffective or counter-productive) political-legal strategy of social regulation;
for an extensive overview, see J. Zeitlin & Ph. Pochet (eds.), The Open
Method of Co-ordination in Action - The European Employment and Social
Inclusion Strategies (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005).
See J.Cohen & Ch. Sabel, “Directly-deliberative Polyarchy”, 3 European Law
Journal (1997), 313-342.
A prominent example is the clash between the EU’s application of the
precautionary principle in its own legal order and the US and other members’
interpretation of WTO regulations, especially in the context of protective
measures under Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement); see J. Scott, “European Regulation of GMOs:
Thinking about ‘Judicial Review’ in the WTO”, Jean Monnet Working Paper
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‘technical’ solutions in contested areas such as genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), hormones in food products, or
embryonic stem cell research. The fact that transnational policies
inevitably have distributive effects34 additionally underlines the
importance of a legal and political embedding of transnational
regulatory regimes into societal structures.
While Slaughter rejects any attempts to set up a written global
constitutional order, she claims that government networks are
bound (or should be bound) to a set of unwritten and ‘informal
principles’.35 However, she fails to show why the acting
governments should be bound by vaguely defined principles of
36
‘global deliberative equality’ or ‘checks and balances’, instead of
being bound by the solid principles of national or economic and
political interests. It does not take spectacular incidents like the
recent allegations of a ‘torture network’ between the US and some
Middle Eastern countries to detect that governments need other
restrictions than just informal principles of a non-binding
character. Everyday practices of negotiation imbalances, for
example, in the context of the WTO Treaty rounds, already show
that appeals to fairness and equality are futile if they are not
supported by some kind of procedural hard law.37

34

35

36

37

04/04 (New York: NYU, www.jeanmonnet.org, 2004).
P. Nanz, “Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance: A
View from Political Theory”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.),
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006), section II.1.
A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2004), 245.
A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2004), 245, 253.
See the report by W. Bello on the first Doha round, “Learning from Doha: A
Civil Society Perspective from the South”, Global Governance 8 (2002), 273279, especially 275-278 on factual imbalances and procedural shortcomings
during the Doha round 2001.
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Additionally, this kind of functional realism seems to suggest that
‘rule of law’ merely means that government networks are entitled
to create international regulations and to call the result ‘law’.
However, in the Anglo-American legal tradition as well as in
continental legal traditions such as German constitutionalism,
‘rule of law’ conveys a whole set of normative aspirations and
‘quality benchmarks’. By levelling the difference between
regulations and law, and by ignoring the difference between a
factual creation and the enforcement of international regulations
and a legitimate legal order based on principles such as justice and
fairness, A.-M. Slaughter’s re-labelling of government network
regulations as the ‘rule of law’ seems to miss the very singularity
of the category of law.

3. SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE RESOURCES OF ‘THE
SOCIAL’ AND THE EXAMPLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION OF STANDARDISATION (ISO)
If the network metaphor stands for top-down networks of a
functional global legal order that is detached from the ‘local level’
and its citizens, then a change of perspective may reveal new
possible ways for a more inclusive order. Gunter Teubner’s
systems theory approach may provide for such a change of
perspective: by emphasising the self-reflexive powers of emerging
transnational social spheres, Teubner avoids the top-down
perspective of world statism and world constitutionalism. Instead
of being inspired by ‘governmentality’ (M. Foucault), his approach
supports a perspective in which a process of ‘bootstrapping’ within
social spheres replaces the grand legal framework.
A) BUILDING GLOBAL LAW FROM BELOW

Gunter Teubner38 has pushed the insight that we can observe an
emerging global legal order without a sovereign world state one

38

G. Teubner, in: Ch. Joerges/I.-J. Sand/G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational
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step further. He argues that a single (constitutional) fundament or
framework for the production of legitimate international law is a
myth, and that there cannot be a constitutional global framework
similar to the hierarchical legal order that we know from nation
state level. Based on systems theory, he claims that the internal
differentiation of societies produces sub-systems with their own
code and their own rationality, and that this has happened in the
process of globalisation on a global scale, too. Precisely as in the
traditional nation state, at international level, there is no way
back to a unifying rationality guiding of the law-making process.
Instead of a global constitutionalism “from above”, we observe
trends towards a societal constitutionalism “from below”, in
which social actors, traditionally not viewed as subjects of
international law, are transformed into “constitutional subjects”.
Their actions are based on strategies that use fundamental rights
not only on a vertical level, against state power, but also – and
more importantly – activate these rights “against social
institutions, in particular vis-à-vis centres of economic power”.39
Societal actors not only complement the process of governmental
governance, they also constitute themselves particular spheres of
legality. A constitution of world society, thus, “does not come
about exclusively in the representative institutions of
international politics, nor can it take place in a unitary global
constitution which overlies all areas of society, but, instead,
emerges incrementally in the constitutionalisation of a
40
multiplicity of autonomous sub-systems of world society”.
Constitutionalisation processes, he claims, are nowadays much

39

40

Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford and Portland/Oregon: Hart
Publishing, 2004), 3. Teubner refers extensively to D. Sciully, Theory of
Societal Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
and further articles by Sciully; see the reference in Teubner (2004), 10 at note
24.
Teubner (note above), 7; see, also, I-J Sand’s contribution in the same
volume.
Teubner (2004), 8. For a pluralist view on constitutionalism, see N. Walker,
“The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism”, 65 Modern Law Review (2002), 317.
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more dynamic within the (private) social sub-systems of society
than in the sphere of statal actors. The creeping
constitutionalisation of these social sub-systems generates, among
others, a juridification that includes a fundamental rights
discourse: This discourse supports the binding force of
fundamental rights within the global social sub-systems and
among societal actors on a horizontal level.
For a constitutional lawyer, as Teubner himself correctly observes,
this concept of societal constitutionalism goes way beyond
traditional understandings of constitutional law, and if taken as a
normative claim it may go several steps too far. One first objection
could be based upon the empirical premises of this approach: one
may well contest his factual assessments that seem to suggest a
linear trend of a similar constitutionalization processes in all subsystems of global society. Deep analyses such as the study by
Braithwaite and Drahos draw a more complex picture of the
enormous diversity within global business regulations, ranging
from far-reaching self-organisation to mere factual power relations
without any comprehensive or fair structure.41
It is, however, neither this element nor the absence of a single,
overarching, binding ‘constitutional’ document that irritates so
much; instead, it is the fact that Teubner relies very much on the
rationality and fairness of self-regulating processes in the societal
spheres themselves. In his concept, the global social spheres, or its
sub-systems, such as the Internet as the symbol for the global
communication community, seem, on the one hand, to generate,
with almost natural force, a set of second-order rules (secondary
norms, a constitution). On the other hand, it is the set of
fundamental rights that safeguards the voice and the standing of
societal actors, an assumption that points somewhat to courts
(national courts?) as the guardians of the private transnational law
regimes, with the inherent risk that courts monopolise the open

41

J. Braithwaite/P. Drahos, supra note 2.
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process of interpreting fundamental rights. What the concept of
societal constitutionalism seems to underestimate here is the
intuition that it is neither courts nor the specific societal spheres
but the global community as a whole that is both the author and
the addressee of fundamental rights, if understood as
fundamentally as the concept of human rights. The judicial
discourse in courts and societal sub-spheres takes place in proxy
discourse arenas (as Stellvertreterdiskurse).42
These arenas have their strengths – they may be, for example,
suitable to foster deliberative processes -, but there are also
numerous open questions: How can interests of third parties be
taken into account in an adequate manner within arenas such as
the WTO? How can equal rights to admission and participation be
guaranteed? And finally, who is entitled to define the actual

42

An additional aspect that cannot be discussed in full detail here is that
national and international legal fora usually follow different rules of standing
and procedure: clearly individuals or individual companies have access to the
courts in the domestic sphere; once a legal conflict has found its way to
international courts or tribunals, however, they lose standing and become
bystanders who can only appeal to their national government to initiate
court proceedings. A striking example of this incongruity of the stakeholders
and parties of court proceedings is the ‘Caroline’ case: In a landmark
decision, the German publisher of a number of articles and photographs
about Princess Caroline of Monaco had won its constitutional complaint
lodged
with
the
German
Federal
Constitutional
Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) against a partial ban on the publication of certain
photographs, see judgment of 15 December 1999 in the Case 1 BvR 653/96,
BVerfGE 101, 361-396. Against this decision, Caroline lodged a complaint
with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). A chamber of the Court
declared that the basic assumptions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht about
the content and range of the freedom of the press violated the European
Convention on Human Rights, and reserved a decision to grant her
compensation (ECHR, judgment of 24 June 2004, case of von Hannover v.
Germany, Application no. 59320/00, www.echr.coe.int). Although
publishers, journalists, photographers, and editors pressed the German
government to appeal the decision (with the effect that the case would have
been transferred to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR), the government
decided not to lodge an appeal, and the judgment of the ECHR became final.
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contents of human rights in their given social and political
context, if not global society as a whole (including voices of strong
dissent). Within the given structure of fragmented global
regulation and unstructured participation, the proxy discourses
within the Panels and the Appellate Body can neither
appropriately reflect or represent this global public discourse as a
whole, nor can they replace it.
GLOBAL STANDARDISATION
ISO
B)

AND ‘THE

SOCIAL’: THE

EXAMPLE OF

One outstanding example for the problematical results of societal
constitutionalism may be the recent turn of the International
Organisation of Standardisation (ISO)43 towards social issues.
Originally, the ISO seemingly focused on only technical matters:
what the measurements of a container were, what and how many
sizes of wrenches there should be and what the definition of a
wrench is, and so on. Step by step, however, ISO has moved
towards social regulation, with the ISO 9000 family of norms
providing a framework for quality management throughout the
processes of producing and delivering products and services for the
customer, and the ISO 14000 family covering a wide-ranging
portfolio of standards for sampling and testing methods in order to
deal with specific environmental challenges and monitoring
standards for the management of environmental issues.44 Right

43

44

For more information, see www.iso.org. The ISO is a network of the national
standards institutes of 146 countries, on the basis of one member per
country, with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, which coordinates the system. It is a non-governmental organisation; nevertheless,
the ISO occupies a special position between the public and private sectors.
This is because, on the one hand, many of its member institutes are part of
the governmental structure of their countries, or are mandated by their
government. On the other hand, other members have their roots uniquely in
the private sector, having been set up by national partnerships of industry
associations.
See the ISO’s self-description of the ISO 14000 family at
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-
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now ISO is preparing another wave of norms, the ISO 26000
standards. What is striking here is the fact that the ISO 26000
standards are supposed to integrate something like social policy
standards into the norm system: they will deal with the “social
responsibility” of companies and public bodies alike.45 The details
of these regulations are still unclear, as the process of establishing
the proposals has only just begun. But one can speculate that some
of the norms may include ILO standards, with the result that a
product bearing the seal ISO 26001 may indicate that it was
produced without child labour and under humane work
conditions.
The ISO example illustrates that Teubner has a point with his
assumption that the actors within sector-specific global legal
regimes re-introduce segments of other legal orders. But it also
shows that his concept of societal constitutionalism is too narrow,
as it refers too much on what he calls “fundamental rights”: by
taking up issues such as good corporate governance,
environmental protection and labour conditions, the ISO has
integrated something else, namely, ideas of “good production”,
“good capitalism” or “social market economy”. The integration of
standards that are derived from other global legal regimes also
challenges the assumption that each “global village” only acts
according to its own rationality: what we can observe here is more
a process of establishing the voluntary links between different
social spheres than just the activation of core human rights. If
these processes are multiplied in other social spheres/“global
villages”, the legal web becomes more and more dense, with

45

services/otherpubs/iso14000/environment.pdf.
In this respect, ISO pursues an aggressive and overarching strategy: “The need
for organizations in both public and private sectors to behave in a socially
responsible way is becoming a generalized requirement of society. It is shared
by the stakeholder groups that are participating in the WG SR to develop ISO
26000: industry, government, labour, consumers, nongovernmental
organizations and others, in addition to geographical and gender-based
balance. “ See www.iso.org/sr.
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private or semi-private transnational actors claiming the authority
both to set and to interpret global law.
If we cannot rely on democratic processes that guide and control
the results of such emerging structures, and if, at global level, we
lack a judiciary that may provide for at least a minimum of
consistency within the emerging global law structure, then large
fields of social regulation fall into the hands of what are
innocently called private actors (by means of a creeping
privatisation of public law). It is obvious that social stratifications
– such as the North-South incline, or multi-nationals vs. locally
bound industries – will have an effect on the outcome of
regulatory processes in social spheres such as the ISO. In the case
of the ISO, the organisation is aware of this problem, and there are
efforts to strengthen the position of developing countries within
the organisation, for example, by providing special funds or other
technical assistance. In the WTO, we can find similar attempts to
somehow deal with obvious imbalances with regard to
institutional settings and rule-making processes.46 These efforts,

46

The WTO has set up a technical assistance service for developing countries
that
are
members
of
the
WTO,
see
The
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm.
Petersmann-Alston debate (see E.-U. Petersmann, “Time for a United
Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of
Worldwide Organisations: Lessons from European Integration”, 13 European
Journal of International Law (2002), 621-650; Ph. Alston, “Resisting the
Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to
Petersmann”, EJIL 13 (2002), 815-844; and Petersmann responding, “Taking
Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously:
Rejoinder to Alston”, 13 EJIL (2002), 845-851), however, highlights deeper
dimensions of the problem: Is an ‘integration’ of human rights law in to
WTO law possible, or desirable? What is meant by human rights law in this
context – rights safeguarding economic performance, or labour rights, or
social rights, or …? A widening of the scope of WTO law would have serious
consequences, well beyond the already ongoing debate on ‘trade and…’
questions, as it might entail an elaborated constitutionalisation of the WTO
as a world constitution. Mere technical assistance for a number of poorly
prepared (‘underdeveloped’) countries in the framework of an expert dialogue
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however, are punctual and voluntarily, instead of being systematic
and mandatory.
If Teubner took constitutionalism more seriously as a concept, he
would have to introduce some “constitutional” principles and
benchmarks that help to judge whether a constitutionalisation
process has failed, or whether the processes of rule-making and
rule-application were fair, legitimate and balanced. But the place
of politics is empty (there is no global constituency, no
parliament, and so on), and the judiciary is absent or weak. Who
cares, then, about the enforcement of “fundamental rights”, or the
structures of processes that really can be labelled as being open,
participatory and deliberative? Who shields the infamous
“autonomous sub-systems” from empire or other forms of power
corruption?
Additionally, it is litigation which finally leads to some form of
judicial scrutiny and legal standards.47 As Harm Schepel has shown
for the field of private standardisation, private transnational
governance is linked to the law via national courts: law
‘constitutes’ private governance through an ex-post process of
measuring the regulatory processes on standards borrowed from
concepts of due process of law and Rechtsstaatlichkeit.
Regulations issued by private parties may deserve recognition as
constitutionally legitimate ‘law’ under much the same conditions
“under which the American Law Institute is prepared to have
common law claims to be pre-empted by statute: when the court
is confident that the deliberative process by which the safety
standard was established was full, fair and thorough and reflected

47

cannot make up with a genuine political debate about the contents and
foundation of a world constitution.
For the function of international private law litigation as a tool, see R. Wai,
“Conflicts and Comity in Transnational Governance: Private International
Law as Mechanism and Metaphor for Transnational Social Regulation
through Plural Legal Regimes”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.),
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006).
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substantial expertise”.48 When litigation starts, however, the
damage has already been done. Seveso and Bhopal may have served
as ex-post reasons to upgrade international standards of chemical
production, or to integrate ‘critical’ expertise into the standardsetting process, but the social costs of such a trial-and-error
procedure remain too high.
The real essence of Teubner’s systems theory approach lies
elsewhere: it shows the virtues and the weaknesses of a rightsbased approach to global law that relies heavily on good-will actors
(judges, panellists, societal actors, etc.). One of the virtues
certainly lies in the observation that regulatory processes beyond
the nation-state reflect the legal culture(s) they are embedded in,
or even confronted with: in a similar way as in the national
sphere, as D. Sciully and H. Schepel have shown, in the
international sphere, too, the participants in regulatory processes
expect, both from each other and from the regulatory framework
which they create or are confronted with, that these processes
meet minimum standards of fairness.
The blind spot of this approach concerns the value and mechanism
of participation within the processes that result in more or less
binding global law: mutual observation of possibly conflicting
regimes (the WTO and ILO, for example) is only one facet of the
multi-dimensional problem that global law without a constituency
produces. If WTO norms or Appellate Body decisions override
national norms, they have to produce more legitimacy than just
the fact that, at one point in the past, a nation state has entered
into an international treaty. A substantive international legal
order in the making needs to be connected to the political
constituencies that represent the primary source for legitimacy,
not necessarily through direct elections, but at least by ways of a
re-integration of public policy interests. And if we are facing not

48

H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance – Product Standards in
the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), 446 et
seq. with further references.
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only punctual interventions but also a very comprehensive global
regulatory machine “in the shadow of the law” (Christian Joerges)
and under the control of (semi-) autonomous private regimes, we
have to seek for more than just a vague form of mutual
observation of global law regimes and ex-post litigation.
Procedural safeguards which bring civil society back in – not only
as outside protesters, but as legitimate voices – may not be last
word, but may be an essential beginning.
Such a normative concept of transnational procedural law – or
global administrative law, or constitutional administrative law –
may even be compatible with Teubner’s approach, if his societal
constitutionalism is read as political legal philosophy: the basis of
societal constitutionalism lies in the good intention of mobilising
the constitutional concept for the institutionalisation of selfenlightening potential within the semi-autonomous global
regimes. The ISO example shows that there is even empirical proof
of the assumption that global regimes somehow tend to reintegrate public law issues (e.g., social topics such as problems of
equality and the distribution of wealth and political influence)
into their own legal structure. It is, however, not enough to appeal
to global regimes for such a re-integration of social or political
issues – we need a systematic approach in order to make sure that
the self-enlightening potential of non-instrumental discourses can
be exploited. In essence, the proponents of societal
constitutionalism have not realised how they could conceptualise
this relationship between societal norm production and public
law.

4. COMITAS: INTERNATIONAL COMITY
DELIBERATIVE TRANSNATIONALISM?

INSTEAD

OF

In his contribution to this volume, Christian Joerges has taken a
cautious stance towards transnational legal governance, especially
with regard to a further constitutionalisation of the WTO system.
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His approach49 favours a comity solution that rests on reciprocity
of respect for national legal orders that are constitutionally
legitimised: The thin democratic foundation of the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Panels and Appellate Bodies does not allow for a
deepening of its inherent regulatory force – the WTO should not
cross the borderlines of “judicialisation”.50 Comitas, a sensitive
humility towards constituted legal orders (although one must add,
legal orders that are not necessarily always democratically
constituted), could enhance the legitimacy of the rulings of the
Panels and Appellate Body. Such sensitivity could – and indeed
should – reflect the fact that, in WTO cases, we are not only
confronted with a conflict or clash of legal norms, but also with a
conflict of the legal and social philosophies underlying these legal
orders, with a multitude of models for structuring societies and
markets. Thus, mutual respect is a better foundation for conflict
solutions.
A recent decision of the US Supreme Court about the
interpretation of the Alien Torts Statute (ATS), an interesting
relict from revolutionary times, echoes this claim. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Brenner relates to the concept of
comitas: “Since enforcement of an international norm by one
nation`s courts implies that other nations’ courts may do the
same, I would ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction under the
ATS is consistent with those notions of comity that lead each

49

For a detailed analysis and critique of Ch. Joerges’ approach, see the comments
of D. Chalmers, R. Nickel, F. Rödl and R. Wai on Ch. Joerges’ paper
“Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy”, EUI Working Paper Law No.
2005/12, http://www.iue.it/PUB/law05-12.pdf; see also - from the
perspective of private international law - R. Wai, supra note 47, section I.4.
50
Ch. Joerges, “Juridification Patterns for Social Regulation and the WTO: A
Theoretical Framework”, available as TranState working paper at
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/3578. See also Ch. Joerges, “Constitutionalism in
Postnational Constellations: Contrasting Social Regulation in the EU and in
the WTO”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism,
Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, forthcoming 2006).
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nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting
the reach of its laws and their enforcement. In applying those
principles, courts help assure that “the potentially conflicting laws
of different nations” will “work together in harmony”, a matter of
increasing importance in an ever more interdependent world. […]”.
Justice Breyer adds: “Such consideration is necessary to ensure
that ATS litigation does not undermine the very harmony that it
was intended to promote.”51
Although not identical, the ATS litigation problem, in some
respects, clearly reflects the paradox of a comity approach: its
success rests mainly on a certain process of judicial self-restraint,
and an openness towards harmonic solutions. It is inevitable,
though, that court-like international institutions such as the WTO
Panels and Appellate Bodies will be confronted with hard cases
that resist harmonic solutions.52 Additionally, the Panels and
Appellate Bodies have the task of protecting the very aims of the
WTO agreements and of international ius cogens alike, so that
national laws may represent only one balancing factor among
others. Finally, recent experiences with the – institutionally more
advanced - European Court of Human Rights are not encouraging:
the Court’s judgments tend to become more and more dense, with
detailed corrections of rather well-discussed and elaborate national
legal solutions.53 A tendency towards the materialisation of the
‘soft law’ vested in flexible international treaties into hard
international law seems to be inherent in such court-based
54
arrangements. It is precisely this tendency that demands creative

51

52
53

54

Concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, Cases 03-339 (Sosa v. AlvarezMachain) and 03-485 (U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain), 542 U.S. (2004).
See R. Wai’s analysis of Ch. Joerges’ approach , supra note 47, section I.4.
In the ‘Caroline of Monaco’ case, as laid out supra note 42, the ECHR clearly
did not follow the principle of comity, but pushed its own agenda; it replaced
a filigree judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the
freedom of press with its own vision of a balance between this right and the
personality rights of celebrities - by limiting the freedom of press even
further.
This claim is supported by the findings of an empirical research by Karen
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solutions for a more inclusive – and less government-based –
55
approach towards transnational law production.

5. PARTICIPATORY TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
These demands for a more inclusive approach can now be spelled
out in a clearer manner. A critical-constructive theory of
legitimate transnational legal governance has to take the specific
nature of law into account. Transnational law – not in abstract
terms, but in its concrete form as a WTO term of trade, as an
Appellate Body decision, or as a Security Council black list of
terror organizations and affiliated individuals – deserves
recognition only if it fulfils criteria that we rightly take for granted
when we talk about ‘law’. These criteria are related to the concept
of law in the nation-state, albeit not identical with them. As it is
futile, at least for the time being, to envision a global democracy
in a strong sense, traces of the idea of self-government must be
integrated into the specific regulatory processes. This process may
be called ‘constitutionalization’, as long as this term is not meant
to signify a given catalogue of rights and procedures, but a fluid
concept, without the underlying bias of an a priori existing specific
economic constitution, and open for public law constraints and

55

Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context,
TranState working papers no. 8, SFB Staatlichkeit im Wandel, Bremen 2004,
http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de. She observes that, even if decisions
of international courts are contested, “I]t is significant that the legal
principles stay on the books because they may well be used in the future as
authoritative sources of precedent,” p. 18. The quotation contains a Freudian
misspelling: She writes “principals” instead of “principles”.
See R. Howse, “A new device for creating International Legal Normativity:
The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and ‘International
Standards’”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism,
Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, forthcoming 2006), who draws the conclusion that Article 2.4 of
the WTO TBT Agreement “provides a complete refutation to the ‘Geneva’
orthodoxy that labor and human rights are ‘outside’ the WTO; for these are
clearly ‘international standards’, and inasmuch as these rights are relevant to
domestic regulation, they have normative force by virtue of TBT 2.4.”
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local preferences concerning the common good. Accordingly, it is
not appropriate to decree a ‘human right to trade’ as a foundation
56
of world constitutionalism if, for example, a ‘human right to
social regulation’ does not appear on the radar screen. General,
universally accepted material concepts of a ‘right’ balance between
conflicting ideas of a good economic and social constitution are
not at hand; the existing structure of the WTO system, for
example, can only represent preliminary results of ongoing social
conflicts within world society and its national sub-societies.
In a national context, civil society is the central stage for ongoing
social conflicts. It plays an important role in the will-formation
processes, and serves also as a forum for social conflicts,
expressing critique and executing control over legislative,
executive, and judicial decisions. On the supranational level, civil
society organizations cannot mimic a strong public sphere, but
they can observe – and sometimes participate in – global
governance arrangements, and open up rooms for a (weak) global
public sphere.57 They enlarge the range of viewpoints and transmit
‘local’ viewpoints to the transnational level, and vice versa. In this
respect, they act as a transmission belt between local and global
public spheres, thus enabling and supporting a higher deliberative
quality of global regulatory governance – at least in theory. They
might as well, however, be seen in a more sceptical light, where
they represent only the loudest, strongest, or most influential
interests, and they might also just represent powerless protest in
the face of global regulatory power.
As a consequence, it is not civil society integration into global
regulatory regimes as such that enhances public deliberation on

56

57

See E.-U. Petersmann, “Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO demands
Multilevel Constitutionalism”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.),
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006).
See H. Brunkhorst, Solidarität – Von der Bürgerfreundschaft zur globalen
Rechtsgenossenschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002).
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transnational law, it is the procedural fine print of civil society
involvement that counts. The focus of attention, therefore, has to
turn from existing structures of transnational law to the processes
that generate transnational law.

III. THE EU AS A POSITIVE MODEL FOR GLOBAL LAW
PRODUCTION?
It is not surprising that the European Union, as the most advanced
supranational entity, is more and more frequently taken as a
reference point for the development of a legitimised framework for
transnational social regulation.58 Indeed, for the sake of the
argument, it is useful to imagine the EU as a ‘normal’
international organisation (which it is clearly not), and to
scrutinise how the law-generating process is structured in this
entity.

1. DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE EU
On paper, the EU is well-suited for a democratic process; Article 6
TEU states that the EU is founded on the principle of democracy.
The institution of the European Parliament is proof enough that
there is a certain degree of legitimacy from below in the lawmaking process.59 The EU, however, found itself for reasons which
were well apparent in the late 1990’s, in the focus of criticism

58

59

Most recently, in A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004).
Low voter turnouts and other circumstances additionally weaken the –
already limited - legitimising force of EU elections: The outcome of the 2004
elections for the European Parliament – as with the elections before – clearly
demonstrated that the EU citizens still orientate themselves not only
according to their nation state preferences, but also on domestic issues,
instead of on European issues. Election analysts unanimously stated that,
throughout the EU, there was a trend to punish the ruling parties, and the
governments they form, for domestic policies. This outcome stresses the
importance of alternative ways of participation in the European law-making
processes.
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because of its lack of democratic legitimacy: not only were the
lack of full (or half-full) parliamentary sovereignty and the lack of
an overarching European public sphere seen as symptoms of a
regulatory structure that had reached its limits, but so were the
regulatory structures with their opaqueness and lack of
transparency. In particular, the prospect of ten or more new
Member States and the fact that the regulatory activity of the EU
had not only increased quantitatively but also qualitatively, with
major fields of rule-making shifting into the core Community
sphere following the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, had caused a
widely stated sense of uneasiness with the regulatory mechanisms
as a whole. Article 257 EC, which foresees a certain form of
functional participation of the Economic and Social Committee in
some areas, only provides for a corporatist top-down approach to
civil society, with rather limited potentials for the production of a
significant legitimacy surplus.60
The European Commission reacted to this crisis with its
61
(in)famous White Paper on European Governance. Instead of
taking up the popular slogan of a strengthening of the European
Parliament, the Commission mainly focused on its own position
within the institutional framework of the EU. It identified five
principles of “good governance”, three of which were directly
related to the legitimacy issue: 1) openness: “The Institutions
should work in a more open manner. Together with the Member
States, they should actively communicate about what the EU does
and the decisions it takes.(…)”; 2) participation, with the need to
ensure wide participation of interested actors “throughout the
policy chain – from conception to implementation”, because

60

61

See S. Smismans, Law, Legitimacy and European Governance: Functional
Participation in Social Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
COM (2001) 428, July 2001. For a number of critical and thorough reviews of
the White Paper and its approach to governance, see Ch. Joerges, Y. Meny &
J. Weiler (eds.), Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the
Commission
White
Paper
on
Governance
(2001),
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010601.html.
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“improved participation is likely [to] create more confidence in the
end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies”; and 3)
accountability: “Roles in the legislative and executive processes
need to be clearer. Each of the EU Institutions must explain and
62
take responsibility for what it does in Europe.”
By stressing the issues of participation, openness and
accountability, the Commission reacted to popular criticism about
its own performance as a non-transparent regulatory machine that
seemingly runs on itself. In this regard, it was an intelligent move
to use the concept of “governance” instead of “government” as a
reference point; this shift in the nomenclature lowers the
expectations to a significant degree:
“Governance is not political rule through responsible
institutions, such as parliament and democracy – which
amounts to government – but innovative practices of
networks, or horizontal forms of interaction. It is a
method for dealing with political controversies in which
actors, political and non-political, arrive at mutually
acceptable decisions by deliberating and negotiating with
each other.”63
In order to prove that the commitment to participation,
transparency, and openness is not merely lip service, the
Commission later published a code of conduct for its interaction
with civil society actors. This document contained the promise
that civil society would be included in deliberations on legislative
64
acts as soon as possible and as comprehensively as possible.

62

63

64

COM (2001) 428, 10. The other two principles – effectiveness and coherence
– are related to functional aspects of output-oriented legitimacy; for lack of
space they cannot be dealt with here in more detail.
E.O. Eriksen, J.E. Fossum, “Europe at crossroads: Government or
Transnational Governance?”, in: Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand & G. Teubner, supra
note 38, at 120.
For further details, see the “Communication from the Commission: towards
a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and
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Additionally, in 2001, a new regulation on access to EU
documents came into effect, significantly raising the level of
65
effectiveness of transparency rights.
While the White Paper issues of openness and transparency were
dealt with in a more thorough way through the introduction of a
clearer legal basis for the access to documents, it’s commitment to
participation did not bring about any satisfactory results in the
following years. The Council and its Secretariat, which had, in the
course of five decades, evolved into a second major administrativelegislative institution parallel to the Commission, was left
completely out of the discussions about enhanced public
participation. The above-mentioned code of conduct of the
Commission, laid out in December 2002 in a “Communication of
the Commission”, does not have any legally-binding force and
cannot be used by third parties in court: the mere self-binding
force of an internal Commission regulation does not entitle
citizens to gain access to committees or other fora, nor does it
contain other possible participatory rights such as the right to be
consulted, or the duty to take contributions of participants into
account when delivering the grounds for a decision. Additionally,
the document expressly exempts crucial areas of decision-making
processes from the consultation process, especially “Decisions
taken in a formal process of consulting Member States
(‘comitology’ procedure)”.66
In this respect, the Commission remains firmly within the
‘Community method’ of practising consultation according to its

65

66

minimum standards for consultation on interested parties by the Commission” from 11 December 2002, COM(2002) 704 final.
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents, OJ 2001, L 145/43.
“Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced culture of
consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for
consultation on interested parties by the Commission” from 11 December
2002, COM(2002) 704 final, p. 16.
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preferences and under its conditions. Under this classical method
of decision-making, wide consultation is not a completely new
phenomenon, on the contrary: as its Communication on
Consultations correctly points out, the Commission has a long
tradition of consulting interested parties from outside when
formulating its policies. It incorporates external consultation into
the development of almost all its policy areas.67 The underlying
philosophy of this consultation policy – that consultation
processes are initiated by the institution, participation is limited
to non-decision, and only directed towards selected actors – did
not change after the publication of the White Paper. Calling the
White Paper approach to public participation and the subsequent
policy as laid out in the Commission’s “Communication” a
substantively new approach would, thus, be a misnomer.68
In summary, in the light of the principle of participatory
democracy, notwithstanding the first steps of the Commission
towards a more inclusive legal structure, the current level of
public participation in the norm-generating processes of the EU is
still not satisfying: the basic assumption that all those affected by
legal norms should have the chance to participate in the
deliberation and decision making process regarding the said
norms69 has clearly not been met by the current institutional and
legal design of the EU. The 2001 Laeken Declaration of the IGC
also underlined the fact that the legitimacy gap is still a serious
issue, and the seemingly failed attempt to establish a formal
European Constitution, with the referenda in France and the

67
68

69

See note above, p. 3.
For an evaluation of the White Paper approach before the publication of the
Communication, see P. Magnette, “European Governance and Civic
Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?”, 51 Political Studies (2003), p.
144-160, especially 148-150.
See the emphatic criticism of A. Menendez, “No Legitimacy Without
Politics – Comments on Jens Steffek”, in: Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand & G.
Teubner (supra note 38), 109.
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Netherlands turning out a vote against the Draft Constitution, has
deepened the legitimacy crisis of the EU even more.

2. NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE
However, instead of insisting on a clear-cut separation between
national democracies and supranational government networks, it
may be worth visiting the transition zone between governance and
government that was established through the so-called New
Modes of European Governance. The most prominent modes of a
specific European governance setting are the committee system,
also called Comitology, and the Open Method of Co-ordination.
The numerous EU committees, legally anchored in a rather
opaque reference in Article 202 TEC, and in the 1999 Council
decision “laying down the procedures for the exercise of
implementing powers conferred on the Commission”,70 play an
outstanding role in the law-making process of the EU. They gather
expertise and discuss solutions; for this purpose, hundreds of
representatives of the Member States, usually, but not necessarily,
members of national administrations, congregate on a regular
basis. Chaired by a Commission representative, the Committees
formulate and adopt measures of various kinds.71 While
Comitology is viewed by many with suspicion, mainly due to the
character of the system as “technocratic structures behind closed
doors”,72 Joerges and Neyer, in their famous 1997 contribution,
have suggested a radical new vision of Comitology as a forum for
deliberative supranationalism in which all participants engage in

70
71

72

Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999, OJ 1999 L 184/23.
For further details, see Ch. Joerges & E. Vos et al. (eds), EU Committees:
Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Oxford, Portland/Oregon, Hart
Publishing, 1999); Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer, “From Intergovernmental
Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of
Comitology”, 3 European Law Journal (1997), 273.
R. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European
Governance”, in: Ch. Joerges & R. Dehousse, Good Governance in Europe’s
Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 207, 214.
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the search for the common good.73 Viewed from this angle,
74
Comitology is a borderline case that seems to resists a clear
characterisation as governance or government. Others have
interpreted the Open Method of Co-ordination,75 a soft approach
towards co-ordinated policies in areas where the EU has no
regulatory competences, as a desirable and even more advanced
instrument of deliberative policy-co-ordination on the
supranational level,76 a clearly contestable view.77
With reference to theories dealing with deliberative structures,
one can distinguish between the tenants of “expert deliberation”
and the tenants of “public deliberation.”78 In its White Paper, the
Commission acknowledged the importance of deliberative
structures within the EU framework; on the former, the White
Paper on Governance points to the role of expert advice in EU
policy-making: “Scientific and other experts play an increasingly
significant role in preparing and monitoring decisions”, and in the
area of “…social legislation, the Institutions rely on specialist

73
74
75

76

77

78

Ch. Joerges & J. Neyer, supra note 71.
Ch. Joerges, in Ch. Joerges, I. Sand & G. Teubner, supra note 38, p 358.
For details, see the report of C. de la Porte & P. Pochet, “The OMC
Intertwined with the Debates on Governance, Democracy and Social Europe:
Research on the Open Method of Co-ordination and European Integration”,
Report prepared for Frank Vandenbroucke, Belgian Minister for Social Affairs
and Pensions, Observatoire social européen, Brussels, April 2003.
See, especially, J. Cohen & C. Sabel, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy”, 3
European Law Journal (1997), 313-342 and “Sovereignty and solidarity: EU
and US”, in: J. Zeitlin & D. Trubek (eds), Governing Work and Welfare in a
New Economy: European and American Experiments (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
See the criticism of C. Joerges in his contribution to Ch. Joerges & E.-U.
Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and
Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006).
For an overview over approaches relating to the theory of deliberative
democracy, see C. de la Porte/P. Nanz (2004), “OMC – A DeliberativeDemocratic Mode of Governance? The Cases of Employment and Pensions”,
11 Journal of European Public Policy (2004), pp. 267-288, especially pp. 269272; C. de la Porte/P. Pochet, supra note 75.
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expertise to anticipate and identify the nature of the problems and
uncertainties that the Union faces, to take decisions and to ensure
79
that risks can be explained clearly and simply to the public”.
While the Comitology system does represent a mode of
deliberative governance, its mechanisms should not be confused
with the characteristics of deliberative democracy. As pointed out
by Cohen and Sabel, “Deliberation, understood as reasoning about
how to best address a practical problem, is not intrinsically
democratic: it can be conducted within cloistered bodies that
make fateful choices, but are inattentive to the views or the
interests of large numbers of affected parties”.80 Deliberative
democracy fundamentally relies on participatory conditions for
policy-making; these conditions are not met by the Comitology
procedures: although national administrations are not forced to
send only one representative and only public officials into the
committees, a comprehensive representation of national or EU
civil society actors is neither mandatory nor the practice.

3. PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
CONCEPT?

IN THE

EU: AN

EMERGING

Beyond the rather limited, unstructured, and quite unsystematic
influences of civil society actors on the Comitology procedures
and European agency actions, there are currently no general laws
or legally-binding provisions in effect that could safeguard the
participation of interest groups, NGOs, or other social actors in
the law-generating processes under the supervision of the
Commission.

79
80

COM (2001) 428, p. 19.
J. Cohen/C. Sabel, “Sovereignty and solidarity: EU and US”, in: J. Zeitlin and
D. Trubek (eds), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European
and American Experiments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 366367.
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Only in the field of environmental law has a move towards
enhanced civic participation been made. This movement towards
broad-based participation was fostered by the Aarhus Convention
81
of the UN, which was signed by all EU Member States. It led to
“Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental
information”82 which transformed the demands of the Aarhus
Convention into binding EU law. However, Directive 2003/4/EC
does not constitute a form of general administrative law; the
directive is confined to a clearly defined area of EU environmental
law.
There are signs, however, that broader defined participative rights
may find their way, step by step, into the fibre of EU law and
regulatory procedures, creating a general framework for
participatory governance. The Draft Constitutional Treaty,
notwithstanding its unclear political and legal future, provides its
own subtitle (Title VI) dealing with “The Democratic Life of the
Union”, with separate articles defining the scope of representative
democracy (Article 46) and participatory democracy (Article 47).
Article 47 reads as follows:
“Article I-47:
The principle of participatory democracy

81

82

The “Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters”, done at
Aarhus/Denmark
on
25
June
1998
and
available
at
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm , results from Principle 10 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Principle 10
states that “Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens” and demands that at the national level, “each
individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the
environment that is held by public authorities […] and the opportunity to
participate in decision-making processes”; see UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (vol.
1, 1992). The Convention text has recently been published also in the OJ: OJ
L 124 17. 05. 2005 p. 4.
OJ L 041 14. 02. 2003 p. 26.
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1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give
citizens and representative associations the opportunity
to make known and publicly exchange their views in all
areas of Union action.
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent
and regular dialogue with representative associations and
civil society.
3. The Commission shall carry out broad consultations
with parties concerned in order to ensure that the
Union's actions are coherent and transparent.
4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals
of a significant number of Member States may take the
initiative of inviting the Commission, within the
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate
proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal
act of the Union is required for the purpose of
implementing the Constitution. European laws shall
determine the provisions for the procedures and
conditions required for such a citizens’ initiative,
including the minimum number of Member States from
which such citizens must come.”
The scope of these provisions is clearly limited, and the
underlying concept of participatory democracy is admittedly
rather thin: participation is more than just the opportunity to
express an opinion (paragraph 1), or the opportunity to enter into a
dialogue whose conditions and consequences are unclear
(paragraph 2). In contrast to these provisions, the consultations
mentioned in paragraph 3 sound more serious, but only in cases
where they take place in a real space with discussants and an
auditorium present, and not merely in cyberspace: written
statements cannot replace the exchange of ideas and views in real
time, in person, and before a forum. Unfortunately, paragraph 3
falls short of a clearer definition of consultations. Most
importantly, Article 47 completely fails to mention any kind of
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procedural right to participation, nor does it foresee any legal
remedy in case of conflict over the conditions of a consultation
process. In this regard, the Draft Constitutional Treaty does not
break away from the thin concept of participation the
Commission proposed in its White Paper.
These conceptual shortcomings notwithstanding, Article 47
constitutes the first window of opportunity for a more
comprehensive involvement of civil society in the law-making
process of the EU. It also underlines that participatory democracy
is – or will be - a genuine legal principle of EU law.

4. THE ECJ: THE GUARDIAN
THE EU?

OF

“GOOD GOVERNANCE”

IN

One of the major preconditions of substantive participation in a
deliberative process – such as the regulatory fora of Comitology is the access to comprehensive information about the process
itself: who discusses what, and when, what the positions of the
participants are before they enter the process, and so on. These
issues are essential for any active involvement. A landmark case of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) highlights the problems and
pitfalls of the existing legal framework for access to information:
the Rothmans case illustrates the oscillating character of the
EC/EU between intergovernmental governance and a rights-based
community of European citizens.
By letter of 23 January 1997, the Rothmans company, a famous
cigarette manufacturer, had requested access to a number of
documents which included the minutes of the Customs Code
83
Committee from 4 April 1995 onwards. Rothmans probably had

83

The request was based on Decision 94/90 granting access to certain
documents of the Commission under certain conditions. This Decision has
been replaced by the already mentioned Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission. The new
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heard that the Commission planned to take actions against illegal
imports of cigarettes through third countries such as Romania or
Bulgaria into the European Union. Many indicators pointed to the
active involvement of cigarette manufacturers in these illegal
activities. The reasons why Rothmans had approached the
Commission (and not the Customs Code Committee directly)
were simple: like all committees assisting and counselling the
Commission, this one did not have its own administration,
budget, archive or premises, nor an address of its own.
The Commission’s Directorate-General for Customs and Indirect
Taxation forwarded a number of Commission documents, but
refused to hand over the minutes of the Committee on the ground
that the Commission was not their author.84 It pointed out that,
while the minutes are drawn up by the Commission in its
secretarial capacity, they “are adopted by the Committee, which is
therefore their author”. The Commission also refused to hand over
the Committee's internal regulation on the ground that the
Commission was not the author of that document, either. Finally,
it stated that, under that regulation, the Committee's proceedings
are confidential. In June 1997, Rothmans brought an action against
the Commission before the Court of First Instance, and requested
the annulment of the Commission’s decisions denying access to
the minutes and the internal regulation of the Committee.
This case was a landmark case in three respects: firstly, it
challenged the practice of the Commission to retreat behind some
form of intergovernmental confidentiality; secondly, it brought up
the question of what the real mechanisms behind the
Commission’s regulatory actions are: how does the EU
bureaucracy actually work, and what is the role of the
Committees?; and finally, the case demanded a clarification of the
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regulation provides for a much higher degree of transparency and easier
access to documents of the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament.
Decision 94/90 provided that applications must be sent “directly to the
author”.
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openness, transparency, and accessibility of the EU bureaucracy:
are citizens entitled to control the administrative process, and to
what extent?
Rothmans demanded less than participation, but a minimum
amount of openness and transparency in the Committee structure.
The important role of Comitology in the law-making process of
the EU – as briefly outlined above – underlines that the
Commission and “its” committees have left the originally
intended function of the committees as intergovernmental control
mechanism far behind. They have turned into a unique,
85
“freewheeling transnational structure”, with its own merits as
deliberative forums, but also without a clear legal structure or
form. In particular, the poor transparency of the committee
procedures “makes it difficult to discern the part played by the
committees in the formulation and eventual adoption of
measures”.86
The Rothmans case shows that the fact that the committees do
not formally possess decision-making powers of their own tends to
complicate judicial review of committees’ work. Additionally, as
R. Dehousse describes it, the “indirect character of the review
process, compounded by the more general difficulty experienced
by private parties seeking annulment of community decisions,
reduces incentives to rely on litigation to ensure the proper
functioning of committees.”87 Indeed, the structure of judicial
review, as laid out in Articles 220-245 TEC, strongly supports this
observation: while the reference procedure of Article 234 TEC
represents the “normal” procedure in which a national court refers
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R. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European
Governance”, in Ch. Joerges & R. Dehousse, Good Governance in Europe’s
Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 207, 214.
G. de Búrca, “The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional
Analysis”, in: P. Craig & G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (1999),
55, at 77.
R. Dehousse, supra note 85, p. 215.
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a case to the ECJ in the event of doubts about the interpretation
and implementation of EU law, individual access to the Court of
88
First Instance is granted only under strict conditions.
Because Rothmans had been denied access to the minutes
individually, the conditions for individual access had been met. As
to the material question concerning Rothmans’ right to access to
the minutes, the position of the Commission amounted to a
paradoxical – and embarrassing – situation: committees are
supposed to be an emanation of the Council, they inform and
control the measures of the Commission. But the Council does
not hold copies of committee documents. Thus, the argument of
the Commission that it held the pen for the committee but was
not the author of the documents amounted to an exclusion of
Comitology from the scope of the rules granting access to
Community documents.89
In its judgment, the Court of First Instance (CFI) resolved the case
in favour of the right to access and stressed the importance of the
principle of transparency. It held that “for the purposes of the
Community rules on access to documents, ‘Comitology’
committees come under the Commission itself,…which is
responsible for rulings on the applications for access to documents
of those committees”.90 With its decision, the CFI paid tribute to
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See the recent ‚judicial dialogue’ between the CFI and the ECJ about the
interpretation of Article 230 IV TEC: In its judgment of 3 May 2002 in the
case Jégo-Quéré et Cie v. Commission of the European Communities, the
Court of First Instance used judicial interpretation in order to loosen the
conditions under which individual access to the Community courts for
judicial review of Community acts is granted. The ECJ, however, rejected
this attempt, first indirectly in its judgment of 25 July 2002 in Case C-50/00
P: Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, where
it confirmed its strict interpretation of the standing rules, and later by
reversing the Jégo-Quéré decision of the CFI (judgment of the ECJ of 1 April
2004 in the Case C-263/02 P: Commission of the European Communities v.
Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA).
R. Dehousse, supra note 85, p. 215.
CFI, judgment of 19 July 1999, Case T-188/97, Rothmans International BV v.
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the new governance amalgam of Commission and committees that
is called “Comitology”.
While the ECJ decision can be seen as a major step towards a more
transparent Comitology procedure, transparency itself is not
sufficient for the effective control of Comitology from outside of
the governance network. It may grant access to information, but it
does not lend a more active role to individuals or to the civil
society sector in the decision-making process. A starting point for
a procedural approach to social regulation in the committee
framework can be found in a second decision of the European
Court of Justice relating to Comitology procedures. In the
Germany vs. Commission case, the ECJ declared a regulation on
construction materials void on the grounds that procedural rules
had been violated; allegedly, the draft for a decision had not been
sent within a certain time-frame to the Member State, and not in
the right language.91 In a number of other decisions, the ECJ has
further shaped procedural aspects of European administrative
92
law, albeit without spelling out clear general rules for all fields of
EU law with regard to legal consequences of violations of
procedural law.
If civil society actors were entitled to the same procedural position
as the Member States possess in the Comitology procedures, and
the Commission were responsible for the dissemination of draft
regulations (and accountable for infringements of those procedural
rights), the Comitology system would lose a good part of its
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Commission, n. 62.
ECJ, decision of 10 February 1998, Case C-263/95, Germany v. Commission.
See, for example, the Eyckeler & Malt case, where the Court of First Instance
held that an affected party has a right to be heard directly by the
Commission in case the Commission’s decision may affect this party
negatively even if the party had the opportunity to a prior hearing by the
respective member state, see CFI, judgment of 19 February 1998, Case T42/96 , Eyckeler & Malt AG vs Commission, confirmed in CFI, judgment of
11 July 2002, Case T-205/99, Hyper v. Commission, both available on the
Court’s website http://curia.eu.int.
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secretive character. This may lessen the effectiveness of the
European rule-making governmental network to a certain degree,
but it may strengthen the system in the long run, and it will
certainly enhance the legitimacy of EU law. The emerging concept
of participatory governance points into this direction, but it must
also be accompanied by an EU administrative law that explicitly
defines the scope of civil society participation; it is not the task of
the ECJ to invent such a procedural framework.

IV. A LOOK FORWARD: CONSTITUTING
PARTICIPATORY TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Is transnational law possible, or to be more precise, under which
conditions does the growing amount of transnational regulation
through transnational governance, public or private, deserve
recognition? This riddle of transnational law/‘law’ apparently
cannot be solved once and for all in a neat manner by zooming
nation state institutions up to global level. The tentative answer
supported here stresses the importance of civic participation:
transnational ‘law’, produced outside a classical constitutional
framework, and without genuine democratic institutions, needs
additional sources of justification with legitimatory force.
Concepts of world statism or of a global minimal state do not
provide for these additional sources. On the contrary, these
abstract visions disregard not only the factual preconditions for a
functioning democratic process of law-production, they also do not
sufficiently take into account that only a law-generating process
where those subjugated to the regulations (the ‘law’) can – at least
potentially - view themselves at the same time also as their
authors may provide the essential element of legitimacy; this
separates such regulations from mere power structures. The wide
gap between abstract visions and the concrete regulations which
affect real people in their everyday lives can hardly be bridged by
an abstract constitutionalisation of international law. Even if the

50

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 02 NO. 01

project is disconnected from a world-state vision, as Jürgen
93
Habermas has recently proposed, the core problem of a
constitutionalisation process remains: how is constitutionalisation
without a strong (global) civil society and without the inclusion of
local civil societies possible?
In this regard, the evolution of the EU may provide some
preliminary answers: Its tendencies towards a better and broader
inclusion of citizens and civil society, notwithstanding the
existing shortcomings, reflect the attempt to bridge the legitimacy
gap between transnational law and local constituencies. A similar
approach towards transnational law on a global scale would call
for some form of juridification of participatory governance, not
necessarily as another form of an overarching ‘constitution’ in a
single text, but as a juridification of deliberative structures within
the regulatory islands of international law and international
regulation.
Procedural rules, and, in particular, participatory rights in the
domain of transnational social regulation, decide about agendasetting and co-decision positions to a much higher degree than
within the national constitutional framework, where decisionmaking procedures in governmental regulatory regimes or in
private societal spheres are still controlled by both parliaments
and by a genuine democratic process, and are embedded in a
constitutional setting of administrative rules and judicial control.
The less direct the democratic input in transnational social
regulation is, however, the more direct the participatory influence
of the social actors, or even of an emerging global civil society, has
to be. A mere superstructural network of governments and
powerful private players amounts more to a return to some form of
benevolent and enlightened absolutism rather than to “good”
transnational governance.
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This correlation between the loss of democratic power in the
national arenas and the growing material regulation in the
transnational sphere has to be reflected and confronted within the
existing global legal structures. As transnational processes are
dominated by public or private administrators, the law of the
transnational regulation co-ordinating these processes has to
integrate the possible functional equivalents of national
legitimatory processes. One element of such a juridification of
transnational regulation may consist of the procedural right of
affected interest groups and civic associations to participate
comprehensively in regulatory processes, following the existing
94
concepts of interest representation that already form an integral
part of a considerable number of domestic administrative laws
throughout the world, and the deepening participatory patterns
which the international community has already agreed upon in
the past.95 Civil society organisations participating in transnational
regulatory structures enlarge the range of viewpoints and
96
arguments present in deliberative decision-making processes.
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One prominent example is the US Administrative Procedure Act (APA). For
a comprehensive overview over its development, see R Stewart,
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U.L.Rev 437
(2003), esp. 441 et seq., on the evolution of the interest representation model
within the institutional framework of US administrative agencies. Stewart
also discusses whether the APA can be taken as a blueprint for global
administrative structures, see R. Stewart, “US Administrative Law: A Model
for Global Administrative Law?” in: 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 7
(2005), available at http://www.iilj.org/papers/documents/2005.7Stewart.pdf.
- Th. Ziamou gives an overview over different national concepts of
participation in (administrative) rulemaking: Rulemaking, Participation and
the Limits of Public Law in the USA and Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
See, especially, the Arhus “Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters”, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm.
See P. Nanz, contribution “Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Trade
Governance: A View from Political Theory”, in Ch. Joerges & E.-U.
Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and
Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2006), at section
III.3.
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This may not solve all the problems of democratic legitimacy
above the nation-state level, but it will certainly lead to a more
inclusive – and possibly more legitimate – global legal community.

1. TRANSNATIONAL CIVIC PARTICIPATION
General demands for better participation, clearer decision-making
structures and transparency, and for rules and procedures for
accountability have been raised in the context of global public
governance for years. Events such as the massive protests at the
G7/G8 summits in Seattle 1999 and Genova 2001 against the
present state and development of globalisation97 have shed light on
the opaque character of global governance in general.
Some global institutions and regimes have reacted to this
criticism, others have not.98 The World Bank is a striking example
of a radical change: under its president James Wolfensohn, it has
launched several initiatives to counter the secretive character of
the bank’s policy-planning and decision-making procedures. By
decentralising the Bank, by working more closely with other
development partners, such as non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), and placing greater emphasis on home-grown
development planning, the World Bank claims that, under
Wolfensohn’s presidency, it has tried to move closer to its client
governments “than ever before”.99 With additional efforts to reach
out more to other international organisations, to the private sector
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For a sociological account of the new movement against the present form of
globalisation , see M. Andretta, D. della Porta, L. Mosca & H. Reiter, No
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Kissling, “Why Co-operate? Civil Society Participation at the WTO”, in in
Ch. Joerges & E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade
Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming
2006), section I.3.
See www.worldbank.org for a self-description of Wolfensohn’s 1995-2005
presidency at the World Bank.
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and to civil society (the Bank states that NGOs now participate in
a significant number of its projects, and that Wolfensohn has also
made partnership with the private sector a central part of the
activities100) the World Bank has tried hard to become the
Musterknabe of global institutions.
Other institutions, in particular the WTO, have strongly opposed
such an opening towards civil society. Even rather limited forms
of outside interference such as amicus curiae briefs were - and still
are – the subject of enduring controversies: the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)
and the Working Procedures for Appellate Review (WPAR) do not
contain clear rules on the admissibility of unsolicited amicus
curiae statements handed in by outsiders such as NGO’s or
individuals, nor do they contain an explicit exclusion of such
statements, either.101 In a pragmatic move, the Appellate Body
stated in the Shrimp-Turtles case, that it has the authority to
accept amicus curiae briefs,102 a position the Body has since
affirmed in subsequent decisions.103
This small amount of progress notwithstanding, the WTO is still
– and still perceives itself to be – a club with exclusive
‘membership privileges’ (Robert Howse). A 2004 report by an
advisory committee to the Directorate General of the WTO on
“The Future of the WTO” dedicates 8 of its 80 pages to
“Transparency and dialogue with civil society”. It describes the
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United States-Import prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, T/DS58/AB/R, October 12, 1998 (ShrimpTurtles).
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Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate
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relationship between global civil society and international
institutions such as the WTO as a “new partnership” with
104
“tensions”, but also as a “welcome and beneficial experience”.
The report justifies this extremely cautious approach towards the
inclusion of civil society with the limited capacity of the WTO
Secretariat. Additionally, it states that the WTO member
governments are themselves the ones that must shoulder most of
the responsibility for developing the relationships between civil
society and state actors. In the end, the report only acknowledges
that “the WTO needs to keep the options of transparency and
dialogue with civil society under regular review”.105
The latter characterisation of the inclusion of civil society in
decision-making processes as mere ‘dialogue’ comes very close to
the attitude of the European Commission towards civil society
participation: in its White Paper, the Commission’s bow to civil
society did not go much further than the proposal of regular
‘consultations’. The much-praised convention method that was
first used for the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and later for
the Draft Treaty on the European Constitution, turned out to be a
practical example of the deficiencies of mere consultations. Civil
society organisations were given only very limited space and time
for the presentation of their viewpoints, and the website that was
meant to be a place where citizens’ concerns could be voiced did
not have any traceable effect: nobody knows if or who ever read
the contributions that were posted there. In the end, there was
only room for a symbolic role of civil society in the constitution
making process.
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CONCEPT OF PARTICIPATION IN SUPRANATIONAL RULE-

MAKING

The WTO report on its future shape and development deals
extensively with the questions of how best to engage with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and how to raise its own
transparency and negotiate with non-state actors, while, at the
same time, dealing with their criticisms. This shows that the
authors could not ignore the changes in world society during the
decade following the establishment of the WTO: in the postSeattle and post-Genova era, civil society106 “is here to stay” as one
107
of the global forces that have to be taken into account. This
‘official’ establishment of civil society as a global force, however,
also marks the end of an unconditional welcome of civil society
into global politics and law: as Neera Chandhoke puts it, “it has
ceased to be a ‘hurrah’-concept”.108 The North-South divide, an
institutional and financial superiority of NGO’s and civil society
actors from the most advanced ’Western’ countries, and the,
sometimes, problematical internal structures of the decisionmaking and funding of NGOs are some of the factors that demand
a closer look at the specific conditions of civil society
participation.
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A popular argument against a stronger role of civil society in
transnational regulatory structures goes much further: The wider
and deeper participation of NGOs and other parts of civil society is
doomed to foster neo-feudal structures or neo-corporatism. John
Bolton, the new US ambassador at the UN, has argued that “it is
precisely the detachment from governments that makes
international civil society so troubling, at least for democracies”.
He does not even shy away from a comparison with fascism: as
“the civil society idea actually suggests a ‘corporativist’ approach
to international decision-making”, it is “dramatically troubling for
democratic theory because it posits ‘interests’ (whether NGOs or
business) as legitimate actors along with popularly elected
governments”. As corporativism, according to Bolton, was at the
heart of Italian fascism, “Mussolini would smile on the Forum of
Civil Society. Americanists do not.”109
In a less polemic reading, this intervention, may, indeed, point
towards a strong argument against the establishment of civil
society participation beyond protest and comment. However, it
misses the point in several ways. It firstly envisions a concept of
civil society that reflects a market-place model of competing
organised interests, thus rejecting the notion of deliberative
decision-making within public spheres; it secondly presupposes
that “international decision-making” is exclusively managed by
governments alone and not by a joint co-operation with certain
business interests, and thirdly, it tries to shield a process of vastly
executive decision-making that is only remotely connected to
democratic self-government.
The topic of participation and its conflict with (democratic)
representation is familiar from the nation state discussions about

109

J. Bolton, “Should we take Global Governance seriously?”, 1 Chicago
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concepts of democratic rule. As Carol Pateman has shown, ‘realist’
and functionalist concepts of democracy have dominated the
discourse on democracy and representation since the 1940s and
1950’s, shaping a view of democracy as a political method (as
opposed to a normative concept of self-government) through
which the active élites of a society take the decisions for the
passive and disinterested citizens.110 Since then, the emergence of
an active citizenship outside channeled ways of political willformation (political parties, unions) has eroded the empirical
foundation of such a concept. Modern democracies are
characterised by a huge diversity of public interest groups and
voluntary associations that voice concerns and debate publicpolicy issues beyond narrowly defined economic interests.
These concerns, issues and perspectives (such as environmental
protection, or poverty) voiced by civil society are hardly
represented within global regulatory networks – a single
government representative per country in such a regulatory
network simply cannot be understood as an agent of a whole
constituency and its internal diversity. The fact that global
governance is widely shielded from dissent and opposition has
clearly fuelled the emergence of a global civil society,111 especially
because nationally rooted civil society actors see the need to
create global networks in order to increase the chances of getting
their voices heard.112
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C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), esp p. 1-8 with a critique of the works of Dahl and
Schumpeter.
On the emergence of a global legal community (‘globale
Rechtsgenosssenschaft’) and a – weak – global public sphere, see H.
Brunkhorst, Solidarität. Von der Bürgerfrreundschaft zur globalen
Rechtsgenossenschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), especially pp
139-236.
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In this regard, a wider inclusion of civil society actors in
transnational regulation should instead be viewed as an antidote
to ‘corporativist’ influences on regulatory processes, and not as a
way of fostering it. This holds true especially in the area of
transnational economic regulation: as in the Grimm Brothers’ tale
of the hare and the hedgehog, certain business interest are always
there and present, anyway. Gregory C. Shaffer has described this
reality in the following words:
“The growing interaction between private enterprises
and US and EC public representatives in most trade
claims
reflects
a
trend
from
predominantly
intergovernmental decision making toward multi-level
private litigation strategies involving direct publicprivate exchange at the national and supranational
levels. Given the trade-liberalising rules of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), this trend has an outwardlooking, export-promoting orientation composed of more
systematic challenges, in particular by large and wellorganized commercial interests, to foreign regulatory
barriers to trade. International trade disputes are, in
consequence, not purely public or intergovernmental.
Nor do they reflect a simple cooptation by businesses,
particularly large and well-organised businesses, of
government officials. Rather, they invoke the formation
of public-private partnerships to pursue varying but
complementary goals. The development of these publicprivate partnerships is seen in the actual handling (the
“law in action”) of most commercial trade disputes, as
opposed to the law in the books reflected in the relevant

autonomous but marginalized outsider”, see G. de Búrca/N. Walker, Law
and Transnational Civil Society: Upsetting the Agenda?, 9 ELJ (2003), pp
387-400, 389.
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provisions of WTO agreements, US statutes,
113
regulations, and the EC’s founding treaty.”
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EC

This finding underlines that the problem of representativeness has
to be viewed from a different angle: if certain interests are already
present in the agenda-setting and decision-making processes, then
civic participation means opening up these structures to nonrepresented groups and interests, thus broadening the agenda and
safeguarding a more inclusive representation of societal interests
and viewpoints. The problem of representation certainly remains
and cannot be solved in a perfectly consistent manner:
participatory governance is not meant to replace democratic
representation. Increasing research by political and social
scientists about interest representation in the EU,114 however,
supports the conclusion that some relevant criteria may be found,
criteria which can safeguard a maybe not perfect, but somehow
proper, representation of civil society through organised interests
and voluntary associations. These criteria, once spelled out in
legal documents with binding force, will open fora for contestation
and dissent within transnational regulatory institutions and
networks.
Situated between co-decision powers and mere consultations, the
principle of participatory governance can be filled with contextsensitive contents, reaching from notice and comment provisions
and transparency regulations, through rights to a hearing by
regulatory institutions and networks, up to procedural
involvement that stops short of a veto position. As long as visions
of a global democracy remain a distant hope, a concept of
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Shaffer (eds.), Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (Lanhan:
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participatory transnational governance is the second best solution
for integrating societal diversity into the ‘law of law-production’
(R. Wiethölter). And it can also tackle the other side of the coin,
the nightmare visions of a global super-state: participatory
transnational governance is a crucial element for a redirection of
‘intergovernmentality’ and its regulatory networks towards a more
inclusive law/‘law’-production.

